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日前拜讀貴刊(榮光週刊)王立本氏所撰「救援盟軍,揚威異域:仁安羌大捷」一文,但見此事之抄述,仍採傳統之單方面說法,然今日國際史學界對該役之研究,早有新解,特摘要數點,以維我中英同盟作戰光榮史實之正確性。

一、中英軍事同盟會談早有進行:早在民國二十九年十一月,蔣委員長便與英國磋商,以求在英屬緬甸境內的滇緬公路,不會因為日本施壓英國而被封鎖。隨著日軍「北守南進」戰略的實施,到民國三十年二月,中英同盟的會談更為增加,於重慶及新加坡兩地祕密舉行,國軍方面的商震將軍、杜聿明將軍,以及英國遠東軍司令、英國駐華大使館武官等兩軍高層,都曾會晤。至民國三十年七月,日軍進占今日越南北部法國殖民地後,中英兩國合作達於高潮,兩國代表遂於重慶召開「英日戰爭時中英聯合軍事行動會談」四次,並於八月六日達成初步軍事合作案。但由於英國首相邱吉爾不認為日軍已強大到能遠程奔襲英美在南洋及中南半島之各殖民地,加上英美的主要敵人是歐洲的納粹德國(重歐輕亞),因此直到十二月美日珍珠港事件爆發前,英國都是對日本南進保持觀望,故中英軍方不能提早在緬部署,其實受國際政治、同盟戰略因素之牽制甚多。


二、緬甸英軍並非沒有作戰:第一次緬甸作戰,始於民國三十年十二月十日,至民國三十一年二月,英國緬甸軍(含印籍英軍、緬籍英軍)、已在毛淡棉、薩爾溫江、比林河,對攻向緬甸首府仰光的日軍層層阻擊,但於二月二十三日西湯河一戰後,英軍精銳盡失,仰光外圍戰失敗已定,英軍始決定放棄易攻難守之仰光。故等中國遠征軍獲准入緬保護滇緬公路時,通常看到的是一直處於「防禦、轉進、再防禦」中的英緬軍,以為英軍不願作戰。實則三月八日仰光淪陷後,英軍仍防衛緬南通往緬北的左河谷(伊洛瓦底江)、國軍遠征軍則防衛右河谷(西湯河),聯手阻止日軍北上攻佔曼德勒大平原。英軍更曾於三月底時為呼應國軍200師固守同古,在名將史林姆(W.J. Slim)督陣下,以機械化部隊反攻仰光,牽制日軍、緬甸叛軍(史稱「打擊軍攻勢」),斃傷敵軍約五百人,但不幸中英兩軍仍反擊失敗,只好各自放棄同古、普羅美要城。此後中英兩軍皆是節節防禦,只是英緬軍戰力枯竭較國軍為快,因此有仁安羌解圍戰鬥之發生。

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三、仁安羌戰役新解:英軍第一緬甸師殘部北撤仁安羌時,採摩托化沿公路行進,但日軍214聯隊提前抄捷徑襲擊仁安羌,並佔領拼牆河推崗(Twingon)渡口公路橋。英軍第一緬甸師約四千人後來雖知公路撤退已不可能,但因不願捨棄珍貴車輛、輜重涉水突圍,遂被阻於仁安羌油田特殊之溶蝕地隙乾燥地形。

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該役從四月十七日英軍受阻於五一○高地起,到十九日拂曉國軍新三十八師孫立人師長下令一一三團劉放吾團強渡拼牆河仰攻日軍、收復五○一高地助英軍輕裝突圍止,共擊斃日軍少佐吉柳仲次以下約五百名日軍,並救出英方軍民約四千五百人,(而非舊說之擊斃千餘人、救出七八千人),今日就此戰鬥經過,皆有兩岸及美英日五地檔案、回憶錄可稽。

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總之,第一次緬戰之失利,縱主軍英軍應負大部分貽誤先機之戰略決策責任,但客軍之中國遠征軍,亦有美籍史迪威將軍調度之失當。然丟疆失土,為中英兩軍基層將士當時所不願見,否則中英兩軍不會在緬屢敗屢戰,節節抵抗日軍達五個月之久!新世紀來臨後,吾人應根據各國史料,完整陳述,始為紀念國軍、盟軍斯役陣亡先烈及鑑往知來之最佳方式。

 
 
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  • WWIIGeneral
  • This is one rare article that discusses the historical event from Chinese and British perspectives. The author is pretty much correct on all accounts. The exceptions are
    (1) The British attacked southwards from Prome per Stilwell's request whose intelligence falsely deducted that there might be Japanese activities in Pegu Yomas, the mountains between the two valleys. Stilwell's intelligence team would plague him with false information throughout the war in Burma. The attack deviated from their original plan of defending Prome.
    (2) That Stilwell committed mistakes in commanding the Chinese Expeditionary Forces could not be further from the truth. Stilwell would later discover that his orders to subordinate Chinese generals needed the agreement of the Generalissimo and the Chinese General Staff. Without their consent the divisional and regimental commands were reluctant to take offensive actions. General Tu Li-Ming 杜聿明 once told Governor of Burma, Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, that

    “…the American General only thinks that he is commanding. In fact he is doing no such thing. You see, we Chinese think that the only way to keep the American in the war is to give them a few commands ON PAPER. They will not do much harm as long as we do the work.”

    My email is yunghsien.yengmail .com


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